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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the Fifth Circuit's decision was proper
insofar as its holding was limited by Martin and did not extend to the
expansive dicta in Nichols.46 By applying the Martin "intent and
preparedness" rule to an attempt to procure employment as a commission
salesman, the Fifth Circuit arguably fashioned or could have fashioned a
limited holding in favor of Quinonez' position. 47 After all, plaintiff had
passed his certification examinations with high marks,48 and but for the
"no-switching" agreement would have, in all probability, established a
clientele, earned commissions, and improved the competitiveness of the
securities dealing business.
So construed, the impact of Quinonez will not extend as far as Nichols.
It would not give a treble damage claim to all those whose employment was
terminated; it would not even give an actionable claim to all aspiring, but
unsuccessful, commission salesmen alleging antitrust violations. It would
only grant relief to those who could allege sufficient facts to show that they
were prepared and able to serve clients as commission salesmen, but were
prevented from doing so by conduct amounting to antitrust violations. So
limited, it is submitted that Quinonez reached an eminently reasonable
result.
J. Kurt Straub
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DISCIPLINARY INFLICTION OF CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT BY PUBLIC SCHOOL AUTHORITIES WITHOUT A PRIOR
HEARING Is NOT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND Is NOT
VIOLATIVE OF THE STUDENT'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
Ingraham v. Wright (U.S. 1977).
Petitioners James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews, junior high school
students in Dade County, Florida, filed a complaint against school officials
alleging that disciplinary paddlings inflicted upon them by school
authorities deprived the students of their constitutional rights.1 Specifically,
46. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
47, Such a holding would, in effect, be the intersection of the sales commission/-
employment cases (see note 21 supra) and the "intent and preparedness" cases (see
note 18 supra) which are both exceptions to the general rule (see note 17 supra). If it is
logical to treat commission salesmen with an established clientele as an ongoing
commercial enterprise, then it is submitted that it is just as logical to apply the
"intent and preparedness" rule to both situations equally.
48. 540 F.2d at 827 n.5.
1. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653-54 (1977). The federal cause of action
was claimed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1970). 430 U.S. at 653. The petitioners'
complaint consisted of three counts. Id. The first two counts were individual actions
for compensatory and punitive damages. Id. The third count, a class action on behalf
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the students asserted that the paddlings' violated the eighth amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment;3 and that the lack of
adequate notice and a hearing before corporal punishment was administered
constituted a denial of procedural due process as required by the fourteenth
amendment.4
After the presentation of petitioners' case, the district court granted
respondents' motion to dismiss. 5 On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,6 a three-judge panel reversed on the grounds
that the facts revealed punishments so severe and oppressive as to violate
the eighth amendment.7 Moreover, the panel held that adequate procedural
safeguards were mandated by the fourteenth amendment before corporal
punishment could be inflicted.8 However, on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit
sitting en banc reversed the three judge panel and affirmed the decision of
the district court.' The United States Supreme Court, granted certiorari, 10
and later affirmed," holding that: 1) the eighth amendment is inapplicable
to the disciplinary infliction of corporal punishment by public school
of the county's public school students, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
the use of corporal punishment in the school system. Id.
Named in the complaint as defendants were the principal, assistant principal,
and assistant to the principal of the petitioners' junior high school (all three of whom
allegedly participated in incidents of severe paddlings), the county school superin-
tendant, and the Dade County School Board. Id. at 654. The suit against the school
board was later dismissed on the ground that the board was not a "person" within the
meaning of § 1983. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2. At trial in the district court, Ingraham and Andrews testified that they were
subjected to severe paddlings which resulted in injuries requiring professional medical
attention, medication, and, in one case, rest at home for a number of days. The trial
court's disposition of the case is not reported. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248,
256-57 (5th Cir. 1974) (panel opinion), vacated on rehearing, 525 F.2d 909 (1976) (en
banc). Other students from the same school recounted similar incidents of physical
injuries which resulted from school disciplinary procedures. 498 F.2d at 257-59. Since
the case was dismissed before respondents' case was presented, no evidence was
introduced to rebut the testimony of the students. Id. at 253.
3. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), citing U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. The full text of the eighth amendment is as follows: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
4. 525 F.2d at 911-12. The complaint also contained a substantive due process
challenge, alleging that the infliction of corporal punishment upon students
constitutes "arbitrary governmental action" and deprives all students of liberty
without due process of law. Id. at 915. This issue was denied certiorari by the Supreme
Court. See 430 U.S. at 659 n.12.
5. See 498 F.2d at 251. Although the district court conceded that the eighth
amendment might apply to some instances of disciplinary punishment, it held that it
did not apply to the situation at hand. See 430 U.S. at 658.
6. 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974) (panel opinion), vacated on rehearing, 525 F.2d
909 (1976).
7. 498 F.2d at 264.
8. Id. at 267-68.
9. 525 F.2d 909, 920 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
10. 425 U.S. 990 (1976).
11. 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977). Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined.
Justice White's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens. Justice Stevens also wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
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authorities; and 2) that the fourteenth amendment's procedural due process
requirement is satisfied if adequate common law constraints and remedies
are available. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
Prior to the Ingraham decision, federal courts were divided on the
question of the applicability of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause to public school disciplinary methods.' 2 However, the
consensus among those courts which acknowledged the possible applicabil-
ity of the eighth amendment was that corporal punishment, although not
cruel and unusual per se, could violate the amendment if excessive force
were applied to the student.' 3
Notwithstanding these federal court cases, the history of the eighth
amendment and of Supreme Court decisions appear to support the view that
the cruel and unusual punishment clause is applicable solely to punishments
resulting from the commission of criminal offenses. 4 The ultimate
derivation of the eighth amendment text is the English Bill of Rights of
1689.'1 While the English version referred exclusively to criminal punish-
ments, 16 the precise intendment of our American framers is unclear.17 The
12. Only one court has directly held that the eighth amendment was applicable.
Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974) (an excessive amount of physical
punishment could be held to be cruel and unusual). Other courts have concluded that
while the amendment might apply to cases of excessive punishment, it did not apply
to the situation before them. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd,
423 U.S. 907 (1975) (assuming, without fully considering, that the eighth amendment
could apply, punishment in this case did not approach a cruel and unusual level);
Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (corporal punishment as practiced
in this school district not violative of the Constitution); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp.
657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972) (corporal
punishment as authorized by Texas law did not amount to be cruel and unusual
punishment); Sims v. Board of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971) (court held that
corporal punishment was not per se cruel and unusual, but declined to rule that the
eighth amendment could never apply in a civil proceeding).
Two courts have, however, determined that the eighth amendment does not
apply to a civil action concerning school discipline. See Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543
(S.D. Ohio 1974) (eighth amendment not applicable in a civil context); Gonyaw v.
Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973) (eighth amendment applies only to penalties
imposed for criminal behavior).
13. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 303 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975);
Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 1974); Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp.
555, 557 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
14. See notes 16-28 and accompanying text infra. It is important to note that the
Court has applied the eighth amendment to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1977);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 passim (1972) (per curiam) (concurring opinions of
Douglas, J., Brennan, J., and Stewart, J.); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962).
15. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-70 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 241, 318-19 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Granucci,
"Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L.
REV. 839 (1969); Note, Judicial Limitations on the Constitutional Protection Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 1960 WASH. L. Q. 160, 161.
16. Although historians and constitutional scholars do not agree upon the
particular event which induced the English to add this provision to their Bill of
Rights, they do agree that its aim was to restrain judges in their imposition of
criminal sentences. See Granucci, supra note 15, at 859; Note, supra note 15, at 161.
17. In a concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Mr. Justice
Brennan observed that there is "very little evidence of the Framers' intent" and that
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Supreme Court in Weems v. United States18 suggested that although the text
of the amendment was the same as its ancestor, its scope, in terms of
limitations upon the government, was intended to be much broader. 19
An analysis of the Supreme Court cases interpreting the cruel and
unusual punishment clause2 reveals two categories of cases - those which
deal directly with punishments imposed for the violation of criminal
statutes 21 and those which involve crimes only collaterally. 22 An example of
the second class of cases is Estelle v. Gamble.2 In Estelle, the Court
concluded that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes" action prohibited by the eighth amendment. 24 Although the
petitioner in Estelle was a convicted criminal, the fact that a crime had been
committed was not relevant to the case. 25 Another example of this second
the clause "is not susceptible of precise definition." Id. at 258. The Court in Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) noted that "[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define
with exactness the extent of th[is] constitutional provision." Id. at 135-36.
18. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
19. Id. at 371-72. The Court quoted from a constitutional debator who argued that
while doctrines or practices might be borrowed from the English, the "principles and
maxims" underlying our government are unique. Id. at 372, quoting 2 J. ELLIOT,
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 437 (2d ed. 1859) (James Wilson - Pennsylvania) [hereinafter cited as
2 J. ELLIOT]. The Weems Court also expressed the view that the framers of the
Constitution were concerned primarily with curbing abuses of governmental power at
all levels, i.e., not merely abuses of the judiciary. 217 U.S. at 372-73. It is submitted,
therefore, that reliance upon the English interpretation may not be relevant. It is
further submitted that if the Constitution is dynamic and open to change to conform
to societal standards, then even the original intention of its framers becomes less
important. As the Weems Court stated: "Legislation, both statutory and constitu-
tional, is enacted ... from an experience of evils, but its general language should not,
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken." Id. at
373.
20. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 21-28 and accompanying text infra.
21. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death sentence for murder);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 241 (1972) (death sentence for murder); Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 (1968) (fine for public intoxication); Louisianna ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (execution for murder after electric chair failed on first
attempt); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (15 years imprisonment and
fines for falsifying public documents); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903) (10
years imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890)
(sentence of death by electrocution); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475
(1866) (imprisonment at hard labor and fine for bootlegging).
22. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1977) (prisoner deprived of adequate
medical care); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion) (person convicted
of wartime desertion from military deprived of citizenship rights).
One case which does not fall squarely within either category is Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson, the Court determined that a statute,
which made the status of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, inflicted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 666. The Robinson
Court, rather than focusing upon the actual punishment imposed, concentrated on the
classification of an illness (drug addiction) as a crime. See id. at 666-67.
23. 429 U.S. 97 (1977).
24. Id. at 104. Although the Estelle Court found that a cause of action existed for
incarceration without medical care, it held that the petitioner had not alleged
sufficient facts to prove his cause of action for damages. Id. at 106-08.
25. The Estelle opinion did not mention the particular crime the petitioner had
committed.
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4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss1/9
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
category is Trop v. Dulles,2 6 which held that a statutory provision which
deprived convicted wartime military deserters of their citizenship constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.27 The
distinguishing factor in Trop was that the Court appeared to rest its decision
upon a finding that an essentially penal statute could not be upheld unless it
served a legitimate governmental purpose other than to punish.28
Therefore, in light of Estelle and Trop, it is reasonable to conclude that
the eighth amendment is capable of fairly flexible interpretation. Extending
the coverage of this provision to include the unquestionably noncriminal
punishment of schoolchildren, however, is without clear precedent.
While the petitioners' attempt to apply the eighth amendment to school
discipline presented the Ingraham Court with a novel contention, the same
is not true with respect to the procedural due process claim. In the 1975 Goss
v. Lopez 29 decision, the Court applied the foqrteenth amendment and
declared unconstitutional a state statute which permitted the suspension of
students for up to ten days without a prior hearing. 3° The Goss Court
reasoned that suspensions resulted in a deprivation of both property and
liberty interests,31 and concluded that due process required at least "some
kind of notice and ...some kind of hearing." 32
26. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The petitioner in Trop had been convicted of wartime
desertion. Id. at 87. When his application for a passport was denied, Trop discovered
that this conviction and his dishonorable discharge resulted in loss of nationality
under 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1970). Id. at 88. The Trop Court determined first, that
Congress lacked the power to revoke citizenship under the circumstances presented
and second, that the statute violated the eighth amendment. Id. at 92, 101.
27. Id. at 101.
28. Id. at 96-97. In reaching its conclusion, the Trop Court distinguished Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). 356 U.S. at 91-94. In Perez, the Court upheld a statute
which stripped Americans of their citizenship if they voted in a foreign political
election. 356 U.S. at 45, citing 18 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970). The Perez Court concluded
that the statute was a proper exercise of the legislature's foreign affairs power. Id. at
59-61. Since Trop did not involve an international problem, the Trop Court reasoned
that Perez was not controlling. 356 U.S. at 97.
The majority in Ingraham cited Trop as a case dealing with criminal
punishment. 430 U.S. at 667. The dissent, however, objected to this categorization,
stating that "there [was] no suggestion in Trop that the disposition of the military
court-martial had anything to do with the decision." Id. at 687 n.3 (White, J.,
dissenting).
29. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See generally Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts
and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1322 (1976);
Comment, Hearing for Suspended High School Students - Goss v. Lopez, 21 N.Y.L.F.
633 (1976).
30. 419 U.S. at 574-76. The Goss Court stated that "[h]aving chosen to extend the
right to an education to people of appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw
that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to
determine whether the misconduct has occurred." Id. at 574 (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 573, 575. The Court held that on the basis of state law, the students were
legitimately entitled to a public education and that this right was a constitutionally
protected property right. Id. at 573. With respect to the student's liberty interest, the
Goss Court found that suspension from school could damage the student's reputation
and jeopardize future educational and job opportunities. Id. at 575.
32. Id. at 579 (emphasis in original). The Court ruled that, in order to satisfy due
process, suspensions of ten days or less had to be preceded by notice of the charges, an
explanation of the charges in the event the student denied guilt, and an opportunity
for the student to present his or her version of the facts. Id. at 581.
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Within the last decade, the Supreme Court has increased its emphasis
upon the need to satisfy procedural due process requirements33 and has
developed a two-pronged analysis to ascertain their satisfaction. According
to the Court in Morrissey v. Brewer,34 the first query is whether a liberty or
property interest contemplated by the fourteenth amendment is affected.3 5 If
either interest is involved, the second question concerns determination of
"what process is due."36 To resolve the latter question, three important
factors, enunciated in Matthews v. Eldridge,37 must be considered: 1) the
interest of the individual; 2) the "risk of erroneous deprivation" of that
interest through present procedures and the value of alternative measures;
and 3) the government's interest. 38 In Goss, the Court found that the
additional burden imposed upon the state in providing presuspension
hearings did not outweigh the possible risk to the individual student's
property and liberty interests.39
The Ingraham Court, confronted with the argument that corporal punish-
ment of schoolchildren could, in some cases, violate the eighth amendment,
relied heavily upon a detailed historical analysis and traditional common law.
40
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stressed that the teacher's privilege to
use reasonable force in disciplining students is a basis tenet of common law
41
33. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). According to one commentator,
there has been a "due process explosion" since 1970. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975).
34. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Morrissey, the petitioner's parole had been revoked
without affording him the opportunity of a prior hearing. Id. at 472. Using the test
enunciated in the text accompanying notes 35 & 36 infra, the Morrissey Court
determined that the parolee's liberty interest was involved and an informal hearing
was required prior to the revocation of parole in order to satisfy due process
requirements. Id. at 482.
35. Id. at 481. As the Court explained, "The question is not ... merely the
'weight' of the individual's interest, but [rather] the nature of the interest." Id.
36. Id.
37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court in Matthews held that when an individual's
social security benefits are terminated without affording the recipient a prior
evidentiary hearing, this does not constitute a violation of due process. Id. at 349.
38. Id. at 335. The Matthews Court noted that financial and administrative
considerations are relevant to the determination of the government's interest. Id.
However, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court dealt with the due
process issue in connection with the termination of welfare benefits and listed an
additional state interest - "to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within
[the nation's] borders." Id. at 264-65. The Goldberg Court found that this interest
competed with the state's financial and administrative concerns. Id. at 266.
39. 419 U.S. at 575-76.
40. 430 U.S. at 659-69.
41. Id. at 1406-08. Common law has provided the teacher with a privilege to
impose whatever force is reasonable under the circumstances in order to maintain
discipline in the classroom. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 288-92
(1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 136-37 (4th ed. 1971); Proehl, Tort Liability of
Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 723, 734-38 (1959). This common law view is also reflected
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(2) (1965).
In determining what is reasonable force, courts consider factors such as: 1)
the size and age of the child; 2) the nature of the offense; 3) the severity of the
punishment; and 4) the availability of alternate methods of effective discipline. See F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, at 290-91; W. PROSSER, supra, at 137; RESTATEMENT
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which is recognized today by virtually all of the states either through legislation
or judicial precedent.42
Although the Court recognized that the teacher's privilege could be
abused,43 the majority found no foundation for the petitioners' theory that
the cruel and unusual punishment clause could be applied to instances of
excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment.44 Conceding that the
drafters of the Constitution expected the eighth amendment to restrain
legislatures as well as judges, 45 the Court nonetheless determined that the
provision was not intended to be applied beyond the realm of the criminal
process. 4 6 In support of this conclusion, the Court cited several legislative
debates dealing with the amendment's adoption, and noted that the debates
referred to the provision solely in terms of restricting criminal punish-
ments. 47 Furthermore, the majority reviewed prior Supreme Court decisions
involving the cruel and unusual punishment clause and found that all of
these cases dealt with punishments in some way connected with violations
of criminal statutes.
4 8
Addressing appellant's contention that limiting the applicability of the
eighth amendment would provide imprisoned criminals with greater
protection from corporal punishment than schoolchildren, the Court stated
that such reasoning could not justify "wrenching the Eighth Amendment
from its historical context and extending it to traditional disciplinary
practices in the public schools." 49 In distinguishing between schoolchildren
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 150, Comments c-e (1965). The majority of courts hold that
reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. See, e.g., Calway v.
Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944); Swigart v. Ballou, 106 Ill. App. 226
(1903); State v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 170, 60 N.W.2d 105 (1953); Patterson v. Nutter, 78
Me. 509, 7 A. 273 (1886); Harris v. Galilley, 125 Pa. Super. 505, 189 A. 779 (1937).
However, some courts have taken the position that there is a presumption of
reasonableness when a teacher administers discipline to a student. See, e.g., Drake v.
Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941); State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365
(1937); Phillips v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354 (1930). These later cases have required the
student to prove malice or serious injury in order to recover. See also W. PROSSER,
supra, at 137; Proehl, supra, at 732.
42. 430 U.S. at 662-63. Massachusetts and New Jersey are the only states which
have prohibited corporal punishment in schools. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 37G
(Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.. § 18A: 6-1 (West 1968).
43. 430 U.S. at 661.
44. Id. at 664.
45. Id. at 665. The Court acknowledged that this restriction was broader than that
imposed by the English model. Id. at 666. For a further discussion of the scope of the
eighth amendment, see note 19 and accompanying text supra.
46. 430 U.S. at 666. See generally Granucci, supra note 15, at 840-42; Note, supra
note 15, at 160-62.
47. 430 U.S. at 666 & n.35. The Court referred to debates in the Massachusetts
and Virginia Conventions and in the First Congress. Id. See 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note
19, at 111. (Abraham Holmes - Massachusetts); 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447
(2d ed. 1859) (Patrick Henry - Virginia); 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 754 (1789). For
example, Abraham Holmes was quoted as criticizing the lack of restraint upon
Congress' power to proscribe "what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons
convicted of crimes." 430 U.S. at 666 n.35, citing 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 19, at 111.
48. 430 U.S. at 666-68. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 21-28 and
accompanying text supra.
49. 430 U.S. at 668-69.
1977-1978]
7
Bingham: Constitutional Law - Disciplinary Infliction of Corporal Punishme
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
and criminals, the majority stressed that the public school is open to
scrutiny and supervision from the community, whereas incarceration
separates the criminal from family and friends.50 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that common law constraints against excessive or unreasonable
corporal punishment were available to the student.5 1 In light of these two
factors, the Court resolved that eighth amendment protection was not
needed in this area. 52
While refusing to apply the eighth amendment to public school
paddlings, the Ingraham Court did determine that fourteenth amendment
liberty interests are affected where school authorities, acting under color of
state law, intentionally inflict physical punishment upon students.53 This
conclusion stemmed from the Court's examination of both English common
laW5 1 and American interpretations of the due process clause. 55 Recognizing
that among the historic liberties protected by our Constitution is the right to
be free from "bodily restraint and punishment" without due process of law,56
the Court held that this interest was involved in the instant case.5 7
In deciding whether advance procedural safeguards were necessary to
protect this liberty interest, the Court relied upon the balancing test
developed in Matthews.5 8 The majority initially examined the private
50. Id. at 669-70. In his dissenting opinion, Justice White criticized the reasoning
of the majority stating: "[I]f a punishment is so barbaric and inhumane that it goes
beyond the tolerance of a civilized society, its openness to public scrutiny should have
nothing to do with its constitutional validity." Id. at 690 (White, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 670. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the teacher's
privilege is lost when a punishment is "unnecessarily severe" or when it "inflicts
serious or permanent harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150, Comment e
(1965). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 41, at 137; Proehl, supra note 41, at 734-38.
However, whether civil remedies can provide effective redress for the student is
dependent upon the standard of reasonableness applied by the court. See note 41
supra.
Justice White, in his dissent, took exception to the majority's analysis
regarding common law restraints 430 U.S. at 690-91 (White, J., dissenting). In his
view, the availability of an alternate state remedy is irrelevant in determining
whether the punishment is cruel and unusual. Id.
52. Id. at 671.
53. Id. at 674.
54. Id. at 673 & n.41, citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 134 (Magna
Carta and subsequent acts of Parliament protected the individual from deprivations
of personal security without due process of law).
55. 430 U.S. at 673-74. While the Court observed that no precise definition of
liberty interest had yet been formulated, the majority relied upon cases dealing with
various types of invasions of personal security. Id. at 673-74 & n.42, citing Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (vaccination); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891) (physical
examinations).
56. 430 U.S. at 673-74.
57. Id. at 674. The Court qualified this finding by stating that "[t]here is ... a de
minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned." Id.
Although the Court did not define "de minimis" in this context, apparently the
majority would consider any conduct which is not intentional or which does not result
in measurable physical discomfort as falling within this category. See id.
58. Id. at 674-75, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For a
discussion of this test, see text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
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interest of the students involved in Ingraham.9 It noted that history and the
common law have limited the child's interest by providing school authorities
with the privilege to use reasonable force in disciplining students.6° The
Court decided, however, that "the child has a strong interest in procedural
safeguards that minimize the risk" of unjustified corporal punishment.61
Secondly, the Court reviewed the applicable Florida law, to determine
the procedural safeguards available and the risk of "erroneous deprivation"
of the liberty interest in the case sub judice.62 The majority was satisfied
with Florida's requirement that teachers consult with the principal before
inflicting corporal punishment and its retention of common law remedies in
the event of abuse.63 The Court further concluded that the mistreatment
suffered by appellants was an "aberration" and that the risk of such
mistaken punishment is "typically insignificant. '64
Finally, the majority considered the third factor of the Matthews
balancing test - the state's interest.65 In resolving this issue, the Court
determined that the cost of added safeguards was great while the
incremental benefit was minimal.6 6 The majority reasoned that school
authorities would likely abandon corporal punishment if forced to provide
59. 430 U.S. at 675-76.
60. Id. For a discussion of this common law privilege, see note 41 supra.
61. 430 U.S. at 676. The Court recognized that whenever punishment is
intentionally inflicted, there exists some risk of unlawful invasion of the child's
liberty interest. Id.
62. Id. at 676-78. The law in effect at the time of the alleged unlawful disciplinary
actions was FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (West 1961) (amended 1976). The provision, prior
to amendment, required the approval of the principal before infliction of corporal
punishment. Id. The section, as amended, has added requirements that another adult
be present when punishment is administered and that a written explanation to the
student's parents be provided upon request. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (West 1977).
63. 430 U.S. at 676-77. Justice White's dissent expressed reservations concerning
the actual scope of Florida law concerning damage actions brought against teachers.
Id. at 693-95 & n.11, 700 (White, J., dissenting). According to Florida law, a teacher or
other school official, "[e]xcept in the case of excessive force or cruel and unusual
punishment, . . . shall not be civilly or criminally liable for any action carried out in
conformity with state board and district school board rules." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.
275 (West 1977). Justice White stressed the fact that the majority failed to cite any
Florida cases recognizing the student's damage remedy. 430 U.S. at 694 n.11 (White,
J., dissenting). He also noted that a theory of either common law or statutory
immunity could preclude the student from recovering in the case of corporal
punishment administered in good faith but which was in fact unjustified. Id. at
694-95 n.11. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (good faith immunity
rule adopted for school discipline actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Responding to the
dissent's argument, the majority attributed the lack of cases on point to the "low
incidence of abuse." 430 U.S. at 677-78 & nn. 45 & 46.
64. Id. at 677-78. The majority drew an analogy to criminal law with respect to
the need for prior procedural safeguards. Id. at 679-80. The Court maintained that the
corporal punishment of students is comparable to the practice of warrantless arrests
on probable cause, since both involve a deprivation of a liberty interest and are based
upon common law tradition. Id. The majority pointed to the fact that while
warrantless arrests involve a risk of violating the fourth amendment (U.S. CONST.,
amend. IV) the tradition of providing only post-deprivation hearings has been upheld.
430 U.S. at 679, citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976).
65. Id. at 680-82.
66. Id.
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prior hearings,67 and that teachers would choose other, perhaps less
effective, means of discipline. 68 The Court observed that such a choice
should result from "community debate and legislative action" and not from
a judicial due process determination. 69 Another concern voiced by the
majority was that this requirement would constitute a "significant
intrusion" into an area for which the states and school authorities are
primarily responsible. 7°
On balance, the Court concluded that while the intentional infliction of
corporal punishment did affect a child's liberty interest, the risk of error was
minimal.7 ' Further, the Court held that the private liberty interest did not
outweigh the burden that additional safeguards would place upon the states
and upon school officials, especially since those safeguards "might reduce
the risk [only] marginally. '72
In his dissent,7 3 Justice White declared that the omission of the word
"criminal" from the cruel and unusual punishment clause provides evidence
that its application is not to be limited or qualified.7 4 Moreover, the dissent
proposed that a "purposive approach" be employed to resolve eighth
amendment issues.7 5 If the sanction under consideration is "among those
ordinarily associated with punishment, such as retribution, rehabilitation,
or deterrence," then the dissent would consider it as subject to the eighth
amendment.76
The dissent likewise disagreed with the holding of the majority with
respect to the due process issue. 77 The dissent questioned the effectiveness of
67. Id. at 680. The Court maintained that a predeprivation hearing requirement
"would work a transformation in the law governing corporal punishment." Id.
68. Id. at 680-81. The Court concluded that such a change in policy would "most
likely occur in the ordinary case where the contemplated punishment is well within
the common law privilege." Id. at 681.
69. Id..
70. Id. at 682. For a discussion of the issue of judicial reluctance to interfere in
matters of school policy, see note 98 and accompanying text infra.
71. 430 U.S. at 682.
72. Id. The majority stated:" 'At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard
to the individual affected ... and to society in terms of increased assurance that the
action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.'" Id. quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
73. 430 U.S. at 683-700 (White, J., dissenting). See note 11 supra.
74. Id. at 685 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent termed the majority's historical
analysis of the meaning of the eighth amendment language "vague and' inconclu-
sive." Id. For a discussion of the majority's analysis, see notes 45-47 and
accompanying text supra.
75. Id. at 686-88 (White, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, this purposive
approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in Trop when it determined that the
punishment imposed by the statute under scrutiny was penal in nature and violative
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Id. at 687 n.3, citing Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
76. 430 U.S. at 686-87 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In the view of the
dissent, use of the purposive approach would clearly place spanking in the public
schools within the meaning of "punishment" as that term is used in the eighth
amendment. Id. at 687 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 692-700 (White, J., dissenting). For the majority's position, see notes
53-72 and acompanying text supra.
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common law remedies for wrongful or excessive punishment, 78 and rejected
the majority's determination that these remedies contributed to reducing the
risk of error.79 Corporal punishment, according to the dissent, is no less a
threat to the student's constitutionally protected interests than suspension.8 0
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the same procedural safeguards made
applicable to suspension by the Goss decision,8' should extend to corporal
punishment.8 2
It is submitted that while the majority's interpretation of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause reflected a well-reasoned analysis of legislative
and judicial history, it failed to resolve several questions. As noted by the
dissent,8 3 the text of the eighth amendment does not include the modifying
word "criminal. '84 However, even if it is conceded that the amendment was
originally intended to apply solely to criminal punishments, this should not
be determinative of its current scope. As the Court stated in Weems, 8 5 "a
principal to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth.18 6
In point of fact, the cruel and unusual punishment clause has been the
subject of relatively flexible interpretations in the past, as illustrated by the
Trop8 7 and Estelle88 decisions. These cases indicate that the amendment's
application extends beyond punishments for the violation of criminal
statutes.8 9 Rather than using an approach which looks solely to the status of
78. 430 U.S. at 693-96 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized Florida law
for failing to provide redress in the case of a good faith error by a school
disciplinarian who has inflicted corporal punishment upon a student. Id. at 693-95.
For a discussion of the scope of the Florida law, see note 62 supra. In addition, the
dissent -contended that Florida law deprived the students of due process since the
common law remedy is available only after the deprivation has occurred. 430 U.S. at
695-96 (White, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 699-700 (White, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 700. The dissent reasoned also that in terms of cost, risk of error, and
interference with the disciplinary process, there is no difference between paddling and
suspending a student. Id.
81. For a discussion of Goss, see notes 29-32 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
82. 430 U.S. at 700 (White, J., dissenting).
83. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
84. For the text of the eighth amendment, see note 3 supra. The majority argued
that, although the "reference to 'criminal cases' was eliminated from the final draft
[of the English Bill of Rights], the preservation of a similar reference in its preamble
indicate[d] that the deletion was without substantive significance." 430 U.S. at 665,
citing English Bill of Rights of 1689. The majority also pointed to the early legislative
debates in the United States which refer specifically to criminal punishments. 430
U.S. at 665-66. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
85. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). For a discussion of this case, see
notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text supra.
86. 217 U.S. at 373. It is submitted that there are other provisions of the
Constitution which have been applied in ways that might surprise its authors. For
example, it is possible that the framers of the Constitution would not have expected
the commerce clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to eventually provide Congress with
the authority to combat racial discrimination. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 based in part on
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce).
87. For a discussion of Trop, see notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
88. For a discussion of Estelle, see notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
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the "victim," the dissent in Ingraham suggested an analysis which would
consider the purpose of the punishment.90 It is submitted, however, that the
dissent's system of classification might prove to be overbroad and
unmanageable in practice, with a variety of state actions becoming subject
to eighth amendment scrutiny because of their retributive, rehabilitative, or
deterrent aspects.
Conversely, it is suggested that the Ingraham majority's justification
for refusing to extend the reach of the eighth amendment to the instant
situation is not entirely satisfactory. The two factors which the majority
listed in support of its decision - openness to community scrutiny 9' and
availability of common law constraints 92 - are both subject to challenge.
With regard to the first factor, it may be argued initially that the Court
did not take into consideration the realities of the modern urban public
school. The existence or effectiveness of community control upon such a
school is not easily determinable. 93 Even assuming a truly open institution,
the majority failed to address the dissent's contention that "openness to
public scrutiny should have nothing to do with . . . constitutional
validity,"94 since exposure does not render an essentially cruel punishment
constitutional. 9' The second factor relied on by the majority may also be
criticized, since the Court had so recently sanctioned an opposite approach
in Estelle96 by implicitly recognizing that an eighth amendment action
might be proper despite the existence of a tort remedy under state law. 97
The major conclusion to be drawn from the due process argument
propounded by the majority is that the Court did not wish to further restrict
the discretion of school authorities99 by broadening its holding in Goss.99
90. For a discussion of the dissent's argument, see notes 73-82 and accompany-
ing text supra.
91. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
92. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
93. In fact, a 1972 Senate Report dealing with unequal educational opportunities
found that minority and disadvantaged groups are often "powerless to affect the
policies of school boards, school administrators and others who . . .make the ...
decisions that affect their children's education." S. REP. No. 92-000, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1972).
94. 430 U.S. at 691 (White, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. For a discussion of this case, see notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
97. See 430 U.S. at 1422 (White, J., dissenting), citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 107 (1976). In Estelle, the state remedy available to the petitioner - a prisoner who
had received inadequate or improper medical attention - was a medical malpractice
action. 429 U.S. at 107.
98. In general, the Supreme Court has shown a reluctance to interfere in matters
of public school policy or regulation. See Buss, Procedural Due Process for School
Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 550 (1971).
In those cases where the Court has rendered a decision affecting the schools,
it has consistently stressed that state and school officials are the primary arbiters of
educational matters. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969) (state and school authorities should have comprehensive authority, consistent
with fundamental safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (judicial interference in matters of
school operation requires care and restraint); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (boards of education have important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions).
99. For a discussion of Goss, see notes 29-32 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
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However, an examination of the factors listed by the Court in support of its
decision'00 does not help explain how the Court distinguished between
corporal punishment and suspension in determining that only the latter
requires a predeprivation notice and hearing.'0 1 There was no indication in
the majority's opinion that the corporal punishment in the case sub judice
had a lower incidence of abuse than the disciplinary suspension involved in
Goss.02 While recognizing that the existence of common law restraints is
unique to corporal punishment, 10 3 the question of whether this factor alone
justifies the dissimilar treatment of these two methods of discipline remains.
It may be argued that the existence of a state law remedy, especially a post-
deprivation remedy, should have no effect upon the recognition of a federal
constitutional right.'0 4
While the Court expressed an understandable concern that predepriva-
tion hearings might affect the teacher's choice of disciplinary method,'0 5 it is
submitted that its decision may have such an effect in any case. With the
possibility of constitutional limitations upon corporal punishment having
been eliminated and with the procedural due process requirements still in
effect for suspension, the former disciplinary alternative may grow in
popularity.
Unquestionably, the Ingraham decision has resolved the conflict among
the lower federal courts over the application of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause to public school discipline. 10 6 However, the Court's
interpretation of the scope of this provision may have an impact in areas
other than corporal punishment. It is predictable that, as a result of
Ingraham, future attempts to invoke the protection of the eighth amendment
will require evidence that the punishment is in some way connected to a
conviction for crime. Moreover, the Court's due process decision dilutes the
impact of Goss,'07 and represents a setback in the area of student rights.
100. See text accompanying notes 60-70 supra.
101. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
102. The Ingraham Court's statement that the risk of corporal punishment
"without cause" is low because the offending conduct is usually viewed by the teacher
is not substantiated by the Court. See 430 U.S. at 677-78. Although declaring that the
low incidence of abuse distinguishes Ingraham from Goss, the Court did not cite to
any evidence to support this proposition. See id. at 678 n.46.
103. The Ingraham majority cited the availability of "established judicial remedies
in the event of abuse" as a factor distinguishing corporal punishments from
suspensions. 430 U.S. at 678 n.46.
104. It should be noted that the majority cited with approval an article which
stated: "[P]rior hearings might well be dispensed with in many circumstances in
which the state's conduct, if not adequately justified, would constitute a common-law
tort." 430 U.S. at 679 n.47, citing Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62
CORNELL L. REv. 405, 431 (1977) (footnote omitted). If the Court had truly adopted this
approach, it is suggested that the implications could be far-reaching. For example,
this could affect suits by state mental patients or juveniles in state institutions other
than public schools.
105. See 430 U.S. at 680-81. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
106. For a discussion of this conflict, see notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text
supra.
107. For a discussion of this case, see notes 29-32 & 39 and accompanying text
supra.
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